The European Union and the return of populisms
The former Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean Dr. Fathallah Sijilmassi once said: “[…] the scope and scale of the challenges we face in the Euro-Mediterranean region, relating to security, irregular migration, unemployment and climate change, require a swift, balanced and concerted approach.”.
With a rate of 25 %, the youth unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa is the highest in the world, in a region holding the biggest natural resources reserves, which could be invested in creating jobs for the future generations. This challenge has been longstanding in the region, having drastic consequences on the countries. Hence, the rampant corruption in the Arab region has hindered the development of these countries, prohibiting the populations from benefiting from the high incomes the natural resources generate, noting that Arab economies have relied for a long time on up to 80 % of such incomes. Also, with a score varying from 0 to 34 in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, the Arab region does not look very promising in this matter.
Moreover, the Middle East and North Africa region suffers from a recurrent challenge, which is the scarcity of water, due to the desertification being a characteristic of the region. Big inequalities exist between the northern and southern countries of the Mediterranean basin concerning the available amounts of water for the population, with the North concentrating around 72 % of the water and the South only benefitting from 5 %. This is turn, generates climate refugees, and according to the World Bank, it is estimated that the number of the climate refugees will increase to 143 million by 2050, most of them originating from Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia.
It is also important to mention that the unstable geopolitical setting in the Middle East which prevailed since the creation of the Arab countries after World War I, contributed a lot in the spread of corruption and lack of governance, leaving the populations lacking their basic needs.
The challenges mentioned above have a great impact on the populations facing them. Therefore, these situations have created “a new generation of forced migration”, where big groups of people see themselves constrained to leave their country searching for better prospects. Since the closest land is Europe, with whom a lot of history is shared, the populations tend to flee there, with every means of transportation available, sometimes putting themselves in great danger. This situation sparked the conscience of the European decision-makers, especially after the death of Aylan Kurdi on the Turkish shores of Bodrum in 2015.
On the other hand, Europe has been hit by a severe sovereign debt crisis since 2008, leaving a lot of its States under economic and financial pressure, such as Greece. In addition, since the expansion of the European Union to the eastern States of Europe in 2004, a lot of inequalities have emerged between the member States.
All these aforementioned factors contributed to feeding the frustration of the European citizens, in which the far-right political parties found receptive masses to their nationalist speech. This led to the increase of their scores in the national and European elections, and some governments, like the Kurz governments of 2017 and 2020 in Austria of the Austrian People’s Party, or the recently elected for the fourth time Fidesz party in Hungary, are formed of far-right nationalist parties. Therefore, it is safe to say that there is a return of populist forces in the European Union, with economic, social and political factors behind the rise of these populist forces in a political entity built specially to extinguish these movements.
I- The return of populisms
What turns civic nationalism into the exclusive sort? The answer depends on the country it is rising in. In developed countries, exclusive nationalism, also referred to as ethnic nationalism, is widespread in times of slow economic growth and stagnation, especially among blue-collar workers. Whereas in developing countries, ethnic nationalism is often used to strengthen the regime in place, and to shift attention from its failures and incapacity to meet the needs of the people.
It seems that a “Populist International”, an expression inspired by the Communist International established in the Cold War, is gaining importance all around the world: from Donald Trump with his slogan “America First”, to Jair Bolsonaro’s slogan “Brazil above everything, God above everyone”, passing by Matteo Salvini’s “Italians First”, populist speeches and movements are taking over long-established democracies.
The surprising reality is that in Europe, a continent which has suffered from the ultra-nationalization of the population leading to World War I, there is a tendency to go back to these ideas and find comfort in them. This wave of neonationalism, or the revival of nationalism, is fueled by the feeling that the governing elites are being “denationalized”, and this feeling is due to the challenges created indirectly by the establishment of the European Union, the migration crisis and globalization.
1- Economic causes behind the rise of populism
The establishment of the European Union and the turning point of 2004
The idea of a union between all the European nations was elaborated long before the declaration of May 9, 1950. In 1712, Charles-Irenée Castel, also known as The Abbot of Saint-Pierre, in his Project for Perpetual Peace laid the basis of a federal union between the European States to establish peace in the continent. The idea was put forward a second time by Victor Hugo in 1849, at the Peace Congress in Paris, where he said: “One day will come where you France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, all nations of the continent, […] will merge tightly in a superior unit […].”
It is finally on 9th May 1950 that the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made history when he declared that France proposes to place the European production of steel and coil under “a common authority”. Hence, was created the European Economic Community establishing an economic collaboration between the six founding countries: Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It is only in 1992 that the European Union, which consisted of 12 countries, was created after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty.
At the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, many States in the East of Europe acquired their independence and submitted their candidacy to join the European Union. Hungary and Poland in 1994, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria in 1995, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania in 1996. However, their application to join the European Union was problematic on an economic level, because these newly independent States had financial problems as their currencies were devalued. As for their economic standings, it was a disaster since they did not abide by any market rule. For this reason, the European Union rushed to send them emergency funding at a value of 2,2 billion euros, in order to help them restructure their economies.
It is only in 2004 that these States became members of the European Union, after meeting all the Copenhagen Criteria, in reference to the criteria put in place at the European Council held in Copenhagen in 1993, which are the principles stipulated in Article 6 and the Article 49 in the Treaty of Maastricht. This expansion was motivated by peace intentions to prevent another disaster such as the Balkan war, to stimulate the economic and commercial growth as well as to enhance European Union’s standing in the international affairs.
An economic analysis of the current situation and a comparison between the Eastern Member States of the European Union and the Western ones is compulsory to understand the challenges imposed by such an expansion in 2004.
At the study of the minimum wages imposed by national laws, we immediately notice the inequality between Member States. The Member States who have the lowest minimum wage are the Easter European States, who newly entered the European Union. To cite some of them, as of the beginning of 2022, Bulgaria has the lowest minimum wage fixed by law of 332 € whereas Luxembourg, has the highest fixed minimum wage of 2257 €. This difference reveals a lot on the national economy and its production. It shows also that a Luxembourgish citizen who has the same job as a Bulgarian citizen, will earn around 1925 € more in Luxembourg than in Bulgaria, hence around seven times more.
Therefore, this inequality in economic factors has pushed several big enterprises and business to move their premises from Western Europe to Easter Europe, taking advantage of the Single Market established by the European Union. This delocalization wave has had not only economic consequences but social ones, becoming an important factor in the rise of populisms.
The European Single Market and the delocalization wave
The European Single Market was established in 1957, under the Treaty of Rome and “refers to the European Union as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods and services. […] it has fueled economic growth and made the everyday life of European businesses and consumers easier.”
One of the biggest advantages of the European Single Market is its attractiveness to foreign investors. The reason is because it gives the investor the chance to directly engage with a market of 500 million consumers. Wherever the investors choose to locate their premises, it does not make a difference. For instance, if an investor wants to establish his enterprise in France, he can locate his premises in Paris or Strasbourg or Marseille. The choice of city does not make a difference since he still is in the same country. The idea of a European Single Market is similar but on a larger scale. An investor can locate his premises in Vienna in Austria, in Warsaw in Poland or Madrid in Spain, he will always be considered as part of the same market, or “country”.
However, this great advantage comes with a big disadvantage. As we said before, the Single Market means that the whole continent is considered as one territory. Hence, this is not only an advantage for foreign investors but also for local European investors and business. This is where the wave of delocalization of production becomes a challenge.
Delocalization of production is “the shifting of work to low-cost (low-wage) countries, including the closing of domestic sites or scaling down their activities […]”. As we analyze the definition, we conclude that there are two main facets to delocalization: the search for a qualified less expensive workforce and, in turn, the closing of the local activities, leading to increased unemployment.
Therefore, linking the delocalization with the aforementioned minimum wage per Member State, the industries are mostly leaving the industrialized States such as Germany and France to settle in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These three States present the lowest minimum wages in the European Union.
The reasons behind delocalization to the Eastern European States instead of a third-party country such as China or India which also have a low-wage workforce, is because first of all, the Eastern European countries are closer. This means that the cost of transport is almost eliminated. Moreover, and most importantly, the institutional frame is the same, since they are, since May 1st, 2004, Member of the European Union, therefore abiding by the same laws and regulations.
However, the balance of advantages is unequal. In other words, some States benefit more than others from delocalization. The example of Germany illustrates well our argument:
Between the years 1990 and 2001, prior to the accession of the Eastern European countries to the European Union in 2004, Germany created through its delocalization 460 000 jobs in Eastern Europe and has cancelled 90 000 jobs in Germany. The profit of delocalization is unequal and has drastic consequences on some countries. We see the rise of unemployment in the country of origin. To add to this, the delocalization of one industrial sector can also affect other sectors to which it is related, and through the snowball effect, the number of cancelled jobs tends to grow higher, and the local economy in geographical areas is seriously affected.
Having presented the economic causes which have played a big role in the rise of populisms, who took advantage of the social frustration, we now move to the political causes, which are the intra-European migration, being also a direct consequence of the Single Market Policy coupled with the Schengen Agreement, and the international migration to which the European continent is subject to.
2- Political causes of the rise of populism
The intra-European migration
While some studies talk about the problem of external migration hitting the European continent, it is very important to tackle the issue of the internal population movement which has been happening since the early 1990s within the European Union.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain in the early 1990s, the European continent witnessed a migration wave originating from the East towards the West. It was not a migration due to political reasons, but an economic migration, with a skilled and educated population searching for better life prospects. Some articles describe it as a “brain drain” from the Eastern European countries who are losing their qualified population which could contribute in the development of their homeland, but instead, is leaving towards the more developed western countries, where they will earn higher wages compared to what they would earn at home.
According to the International Monetary Fund, around 20 million, the equivalent of approximately 6% of the population of the Eastern European States, have left the region towards the Western European countries. Nearly one half of the migrants went to Germany, Italy and Spain, mainly because of the geographical proximity of these countries. For instance, around 350 000 Hungarians live outside the country since 2014, mainly in the aforementioned countries.
The factors which have encouraged and enhanced migration, lie also in the facilitations and the openness, the European Union has offered to these once-closed Soviet States. Transportation cost was low, due to the aforementioned geographical proximity and circulation became easier, and more accessible to the population willing to move. Moreover, another important factor is the establishment of the Schengen Area, which has not only facilitated the circulation of goods but also of people.
Article 2 of the “Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders”, also known as the Schengen Agreement, in reference to the Luxembourgish city where the Agreement was signed in 1985, stipulates that: “With regard to the movement of persons, from 15 June 1985, the police and customs authorities shall as a general rule carry out simple surveillance of private vehicles crossing the common border at reduced speed, without requiring such vehicles to stop […]”. In its construction process, one of the main goals of the European Union was to guarantee the free movement of persons in order to achieve peace and enhance contact and exchange between populations. Therefore, the Schengen Agreement was one of the main successes of the Union.
The core purpose of the Schengen Agreement is to ensure that European citizens are not subject to special formalities when they travel from one country to another. It wants and has succeeded in ensuring the freedom of movement of persons. It is only in 1995, ten years after the Agreement was signed, that border controls were abolished between the five signatory States. A lot of European citizens commute daily from one country to another for work. For instance, 312 000, around 6 % of the Swiss total workforce is made of non-Swiss who commute daily to Switzerland. This has been possible thanks to the Schengen Agreement.
Having mentioned Switzerland, the latter is not part of the European Union but is a member State in the Schengen Area. On the other hand, the United Kingdom is a member State in the European Union but is not part of the Schengen Area. Hence, out of the 28 European Member States, twenty-two EU Member States are full members of the Schengen Area, while six EU Member States are not, being Ireland, the United Kingdom, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus. In addition to Switzerland, Iceland and Norway also non-EU Member States, are part of the Schengen Area.
Consequently, the free movement of people and the facilitation of their stay in a foreign country, due to the advantages given by the Schengen Agreement, has promoted the xenophobic feeling in the European countries. To illustrate this argument, we will mention the issue of the “Polish Plumber”, a trending dictum in France, popularized by the French opposition in its campaign against the Bolkestein Directive in 2006. The “Polish Plumber” refers to the cheap labor, especially the one originating from East Europe.
The Bolkestein Directive, formally known as the Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, is a widely controversial directive dividing the European public opinion on its effectiveness in enhancing economies and on its social consequences.
The proposition of the Directive was advanced by then-European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Frederik “Frits” Bolkestein in 2005, during the time where a European debate was taking place concerning the implementation of a European Constitution.
The Bolkestein Directive proposes the liberalization of services within the European Union. It also establishes simplified modalities for a service provider to follow. In other words, if a service provider from one EU Member State wants to offer its services in another EU Member States, it no longer faces difficult procedures as it once did.
For example, if a German service provider wishes to offer its services in France, thanks to the Bolkestein Directive, it can do so easily and without any major difficulties.
However, the controversial issue lies in the modalities the directive established concerning the wage to be applied on the service provider as well as the social issues it begets. The Directive stipulated before its amendment, that the service provider hired by an employer receives the wages and the social security benefits of the country he originally belongs to, in accordance with the Principle of the Country of Origin. However, after the amendments, this principal was replaced by the phrase “freedom to provide services”.
After reading the Directive, some issues become clear and justify the rise of eurosceptism and xenophobia. We quote Phillipe de Villiers, former leader of the dissolved political party Mouvement pour la France who, in an interview with the French newspaper Le Figaro in 2005 said: “This affair is very serious because it lets the Polish plumber and/or the Estonian architect propose their services in France according to the salaries and the social security rules of their country of origin”. This clause in the Directive therefore gives the employer the ability to hire foreign workers and pay them less than he would do if he hired national workers, resulting in social dumping.
Social dumping is a term used in many sectors related to economy and labor and can be used at different levels. There is not one definition to the term, but a general one advanced in the numerous contributions in the field of economy theory, includes the following: “[…] the practice, undertaken by self-interested market participants, of undermining or evading existing social regulations with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage”. By the word practice, we narrow the definition to the fact of “seeking to maximize profit through lower labor costs in another Member State, or within the same country or company” by employing low-wage workforce and therefore reducing the spending and maximizing the profit.
Accordingly, the Bolkestein Directive indirectly encourages the social dumping, giving the foreign workers in one country the advantage over nationals, who benefit from the high wages enforced by the State. To illustrate our argument, the Polish Plumber catchphrase comes in handy, symbolizing low-wage labor.
Social dumping has resulted in the loss of many jobs by national workers, especially the workers who are employed in industries. Coupled with delocalization, social dumping has increased social grief and xenophobic feelings, therefore increased the masses in the far-right populist movements. To add to this, extra European migration has become another factor in fueling social grief.
Migration waves from oversees hitting the European continent
Immigration to Europe is not a new phenomenon the continent is witnessing. In the 20th century, many immigrants from around the world have left their countries to settle for a new life in Europe.
These migrants come from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, travelling by sea or land. Countries such as Libya became one of the main migration corridors.
What has alarmed the European Union is the increase of the number of drowning vessels in the sea. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 123.318 migrants arrived to Europe in 2021 by land and sea, and until April 2022, 18.238 migrants reached the European shores. The countries of origin are as of January 2021 until today, Tunisia, from where 16.365 migrants arrived, Egypt with a number of 10.037 migrants, 9.089 Bangladeshi, followed by 5.302 Syrians. It is worth noting that in 2015 and 2016, 2,3 million illegal crossings were detected by the European external border control agency Frontex.
Moreover, since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011, many families have left the country, creating the largest refugee and displacement crisis in the modern history, according to United Nations. It has pushed 5,6 million Syrians to leave Syria to neighboring countries like Lebanon, which is hosting around 839,788 registered refugees and Turkey which has 3,763,565 registered refugees.
With all these asylum-seekers arriving to Europe, the European Union faced a big humanitarian crisis. In an attempt to organize the response to the problem the Dublin Regulation was put in place in 2013 in order to harmonize the burden of the asylum seekers on the Member States.
The Dublin Agreement (Regulation 604/2013), establishes “the criteria and mechanism for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person”. We understand by this definition that the asylum-seekers should be registered in the first country they arrive to, and therefore gives the country of arrival the right to grant the asylum-seeker a permit or to refuse it.
However, the limits of the Dublin Agreement, lie in the pressure put on the southern and eastern States of the European Union, being Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. These States refused to become Europe’s “refugee camps”, quoting Italy’s Vice Prime Minister and Interior Minister “Italy cannot become Europe’s refugee camp”, with all the problems they are already enduring, with Greece facing a financial crisis. This feeling of being Europe’s “refugee camp” coupled with the financial crisis has exacerbated the xenophobic feelings within societies, and therefore contributed in growing the ranks of the far right. For instance, in Greece, we saw the rise of a neo-Nazi party “Golden Dawn”, who won 7% of election votes, arriving third behind Syriza and New Democracy in 2015, who is now facing trials for racist, xenophobic and criminal behavior.
The rise of the far-right and populist parties has tremendous consequences on the European Union, as these parties are Eurosceptic. Also, as they do not believe in the advantages of the European Union, they also fuel xenophobic arguments to rally the masses.
II- Consequences of the rise of populism
1- One in four Europeans vote populist
A populist wave took over the world, with a lot of populist governments taking power in many countries. Europe is not the exception, where you have populist forces taking part in the government of some countries. Out of all the European countries, 11 countries have seen far-right leaders into the government.
Populist parties have more than tripled in popularity in Europe in the last 20 years. A study conducted by The Guardian shows that from 1998 until 2018, populist forces have been gaining grounds in the political sphere: they have increased their votes from 7% to 15%.
To illustrate the phenomenon, it is wise to present some concrete numbers. In France for instance, Marine Le Pen’s right-wing Rassemblement National (ex-Front National) won 13,2% of the votes in the French general elections in 2017. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland, also a right-wing party, collected 12,6% of the votes in the 2017 German general elections. As for Hungary, Viktor Orban’s Fidesz won 44,9% of the votes in the general elections in 2014 and 53,7% in the last elections held in April 2022, with 9 points increase. As for Italy, the right-wing Lega scored 17,4% in the general elections in 2018 and the centrist Movimento 5 Stelle scored 32,7%, forcing both parties to share the government’s formation and Vice Presidency.
It is also pertinent to our analysis to study the electoral basis and how the public opinion is oriented. For this matter, we will be analyzing the French presidential election of 2017.
Looking at the geography of the votes casted for Marine Le Pen’s Front National, we see that in the North of France and in the South, it scored between 29% to 35%, which is above the national average of 23%. However, in the West of France and in the central regions, the Front National did not score more than the national average.
The geography of the votes corresponds to the industrialized regions of France. In other words, the Front National gathered 37% of its votes from the workers, not to mention the unemployed persons who made 26% of its electoral basis. These persons – the workers – work in the industrialized regions of France, which we mentioned above. However, being touched by the delocalization wave, these regions have witnessed a lot of the companies and industries moving to other parts of Europe, where labor is cheaper. This has contributed to the rise of unemployment and consequently to the rise of xenophobia and nationalism.
On a European level, if we look at the results of the European parliamentary elections of 2014, we see that if we combine the seats of the right-wing parties, the total result is 118 seats, 48 seats for the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD) group and 70 for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which translates into 15,7% of the European Parliament. Whereas in the 2019 elections, the number of right-wing seats increased to reach 135, 62 for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group and 73 for the Identity and Democracy group (ID), translating into 17,9% of the European Parliament, in a slight increase of 2 points.
2- The rise of xenophobia in Europe
If we look back to the ancient Greek terms which underlie the word xenophobia, we discover that xenophobic individuals are literally “stranger fearing”. Xenophobia, that elegant-sounding name for an aversion to persons unfamiliar, ultimately derives from two Greek terms: xenos, which can be translated as “stranger”, and phobos, which means “fear”. Xenophia is embodied in discriminatory attitudes and behavior, and often culminates in violence, abuses of all types, and exhibitions of hatred.
Studies on xenophobia have attributed such hatred of foreigners to a number of causes: the fear of losing social status and identity; a threat, perceived or real, to citizens’ economic success; a way of reassuring the national self and its boundaries in times of national crisis; a feeling of superiority; poor intercultural information. According to the latter argument, xenophobes presumably do not have the adequate information about the people they hate and, since they do not know how to deal with such people, they see them as a threat.
Xenophobia derives from the sense that non-citizens pose some sort of a threat to the recipients’ identity or their individual rights and is also closely connected with the concept of nationalism: the sense in each individual of membership in the political nation as an essential ingredient in his or her sense of identity. To this end, a notion of citizenship can lead to xenophobia when it becomes apparent that the government does not guarantee protection of individual rights. This is all the more apparent where poverty and unemployment is rampant.
And as we demonstrated earlier, the European continent is witnessing a wave of xenophobia and nationalism closely related to the establishment of the European Union, and the regulations which are perceived by many as encouraging immigration, therefore stimulating the feelings of hatred towards these immigrants who are “taking the national jobs”. The Birkenstein regulation and the big wave of delocalization have contributed a lot in enhancing the nationalist feeling, in a time of generalized financial and economic crisis in the European continent. However, extra-European immigration, bringing many foreigners from the African continent and the Middle-East, has also revived the fear of Islam, known as Islamophobia.
We have seen throughout the study the causes of the rise of populism, which are usually presented as the migration waves which hit the European continent. However, we believe that other causes lie behind the fact that one in four Europeans votes for a populist party. The migrants who arrive to Europe, legally or illegally, were the drop which caused the flood of passions in the European societies.
We trace the reasons behind the European “anxiety” to the European establishment, and especially to the turning point of 2004, when the Eastern former Soviet States became members of the Union. This is when huge economic disparities appeared between the “old European Union” and the “new European Union”, with the Eastern European countries still suffering from serious economic and financial problems, translated for instance in the minimum national wage which could be of 300 euros in Eastern Europe, while it could reach at least 2000 euros in the Western part of the Union.
Moreover, as we saw, the European Union and the Single Market are complementary. Therefore, as soon as the new countries entered the European Union in 2004, they became part of the Single Market which has an advantage, being that it benefits companies who have direct access to a larger number of consumers, but it also encourages them to delocalize their business to countries with lower wages and more flexible law. This is what happened in the European Union, where a lot of companies left their countries of origin to establish themselves in Eastern Europe, where they could make more financial benefits but leave a large number of people jobless and unemployed.
With unemployment comes anxiety and anger. And to top everything, the intra-European migration exacerbated the fears of the unemployed, because big companies engaged in employing foreigners who earned lower salaries than the nationals, a phenomenon called social dumping. Not to mention the Birkenstein directive and the birth of the rather pejorative expression of the “Polish plumber”, which became the icon of social dumping.
Finally, the migrants took the fall, in a context of severe economic and financial crisis in the European country, enhancing xenophobic, islamophobic and Eurosceptic feelings. The populist parties took advantage of the population’s frustration and gained in representation in many Parliaments and in the Governments. Eurosceptic movements are gaining power, with the Brexit as a precise example, and the European Union must put itself in a state of revision to preserve itself and its attraction power as the best model of “in varietate concordia”.
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• The European Commission – DG Migration and Home Affairs, “Europe without borders, The Schengen Area”, 2011.
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• Syria Emergency, https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html.
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- F. Sijilmassi, “Forword”, The Union for the Mediterranean: An Action-driven Organization for Regional Cooperation and Development, 2017, p. 4.
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- BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018, p. 12.
- J. Bahout and P. Cammack, “Arab Political economy: Pathways for Equitable Growth”, https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/09/arab-political-economy-pathways-for-equitable-growth-pub-77416.
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- I. Tabet, La Poudrière du Proche-Orient, De sa fabrication à la guerre en Syrie, Éditions Universitaires Européennes, 2018, p. 3.
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- B. Groendahl, & J. Tirone, Protests and populist cheers greet Kurz as Austria Chancellor, 2018, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-17/kurz-set-to-become-austrian-chancellor-backed-by-nationalists.
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- “League of Nationalists”, The Economist, November 2016, p. 54.
- Ibid., p. 51.
- “President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts America First.” The White House, The United States Government, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/.
- “Jair Bolsonaro hopes to be Brazil’s Donald Trump”, The Economist, November 2017.
- A. Girardi, “Salvini Made “Italians First” His Slogan: What About Britalians After Brexit?”, https://www.forbes.com/sites/annalisagirardi/2018/11/17/salvini-made-of-italians-first-his-slogan-what-about-britalians-after-brexit/#71de6ce72eff.
- G. Bossuat, Histoire de l’Union Européenne, Fondations, élargissements, avenir, Belin, 2009, p. 9.
- P. Perrineau, “L’irruption nationale-populiste”, in Le Retour des Populismes, L’État du Monde 2019 (dir. B. Badie and D. Vidal), Éditions La Découverte, 2018, p. 72.
- P. Riley, “The Abbé De St. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe”, World Affairs, Winter 1974-1975, Vol. 137, no 3, p. 186.
- E. Lejeune-Resnik, “L’idée d’États-Unis d’Europe au Congrès de la Paix de 1849”, Révolutions et mutations au XIXème siècle, 1991, no 11, p. 65.
- G. Bossuat, Histoire de l’Union Européenne, Fondations, élargissements, avenir, p. 15.
- Ibid., p. 159.
- “The European Union.”, https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history_en.
- G. Bossuat, Histoire de l’Union Européenne, Fondations, élargissements, avenir, p. 385.
- G. Bossuat, Histoire de l’Union Européenne, Fondations, élargissements, avenir, p. 322.
- Ibid. p. 323.
- T. EU, art. 6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
- Ibid., art. 49.
- صبح ع.، النزاعات الإقليمية في نصف قرن، دار المنهل اللبناني، ج 2، ص. 267. [Regional conflicts in half a century, Tome 2, Al Manhal Al Lubnani Publishing].
- H. Qiao, L’impact de l’élargissement de l’Union européenne sur ses relations économiques intra et extra européennes, mémoire en Administration Publique, Strasbourg, 2005, p. 6.
- First 2022 data on minimum wages in the EU, Eurostat, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220128-2.
- “The European Single Market.” ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en.
- K. Kilvits (Prof. Dr.),“Delocalisation of production: threats and opportunities for Estonia”, https://www.unifr.ch/iicee/assets/files/W2_KILVITS.pdf.
- F. Benaroya and B. Valersteinas, “Délocalisations dans les PECO, Retour sur des idées reçues”, Le Courrier des pays de l’Est, 2005, no 1048, p. 68.
- Ibid., p. 67.
- Ibid., p. 69.
- T. Parikh, “The EU’s Other Migration Problem”, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2017-03-30/eus-other-migration-problem.
- R. Atoyan et al., Emigration and its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe, IMF, 2016, p. 8.
- Ibid., p. 9 -10.
- A. Greenberg, The Government of Hungary is going to pay its young people just to live there, 2015, Time, https://time.com/3945480/hungary-immigration-come-home-young-person-allowance/, last accessed April 9, 2022.
- Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)&from=EN.
- The European Commission – DG Migration and Home Affairs, “Europe without borders, The Schengen Area”, 2011, p. 2.
- “Cross-border workers”, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/cross-border-workers/43795326.
- “Europe without borders, The Schengen Area”, p. 2.
- Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0123&from=FR.
- O. Derruine, “De la proposition Bolkestein à la directive services”, Courrier hebdomadaire, 2007, no 1962-1963, p. 51.
- J. Vallet, “Passe d’arme France-Pologne : d’où vient le « plombier polonais » ?”, http://www.rfi.fr/europe/20170826-france-pologne-plombier-polonais-travailleur-detache-macron-bolkestein.
- M. Bernaciak, “Social dumping and the EU integration process”, European Trade Union Institute, 2014, p. 4.
- M. Kiss, “Understanding social dumping in the European Union”, 2017, EPRS, p. 2.
- Operation Portal, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.
- “EU migrant crisis: facts and figures”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrant-crisis-facts-and-figures.
- “Syria conflict at 5 years: the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time demands a huge surge in solidarity”, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-years-biggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html.
- Syria Emergency, https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html.
- Operation Portal, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71.
- Operation Portal, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113.
- Regulation no 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=en.
- D. Trilling, “The irrational fear of migrants carries a deadly price for Europe”, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/28/migrants-europe-eu-italy-matteo-salvini.
- Council on Foreign Relations, “Greece’s Debt, 1974-2018”, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline.
- H. Smith, “Neo-fascist Greek party takes third place in wave of voter fury”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/21/neo-fascist-greek-party-election-golden-dawn-third-place.
- D. Trilling, Golden Dawn: the rise and fall of Greece’s neo-Nazis, 2020, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/mar/03/golden-dawn-the-rise-and-fall-of-greece-neo-nazi-trial.
- P. Lewis et al., “Revealed: one in four Europeans vote populist”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-vote-populist
- H. Vernet, “Populisme en Europe: la vague qui peut tout emporter”, http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/populisme-en-europe-la-vague-qui-peut-tout-emporter-11-03-2018-7601733.php.
- R. Trait & F. Garamvolgyi, Victor Orbán wins fourth consecutive term as Hungary’s prime minister, 2022, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/03/viktor-orban-expected-to-win-big-majority-in-hungarian-general-election.
- Election results, 2014, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html.
- Election results, 2019, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en.
- “Xenophobia”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia.
- H. Solomon et H. Kosaka, “Xenophobia in South Africa: Reflections, Narratives and Recommendations”, Southern African Peace and Security Studies, 2, p. 5-6.
- Motto of the European Union, which translates to “United in diversity”.
الاتحاد الأوروبي وعودة الشعبويات
تفشّت في الآونة الأخيرة موجة من الشعبويات في عدد من الدول الأوروبية، إذ حصدت الأحزاب اليمينية المتطرفة أكبر عدد من المقاعد في المجالس النيابية الوطنية وعلى المستوى الأوروبي، مقارنة بما كانت تحصده من نتيجة في السابق. فمن العام ١٩٩٨ إلى ٢٠١٨، زاد عدد الأصوات التي نالتها هذه الأحزاب من ٧٪ إلى ١٥٪. فهذا الأمر لافت في القارة الأوروبية، التي تغنت منذ انتهاء الحرب العالمية الثانية بسلامٍ دائم، وكرست في أذهان شعوبها قيم الانفتاح والعدالة الاجتماعية وحقوق الإنسان، التي تجلت في إنشاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، رمزًا ومرجعًا لهذه القيم الإنسانية.
فهذه الموجة اليمينية غير المألوفة في القارة الأوروبية تطرح بعض الأسئلة عن أسباب ظهورها وتفشيها في عدد من الدول. ويتبين لنا بعد التعمق بالوضع القائم على القارة الأوروبية، أن أسباب صعود الأحزاب اليمينية متعددة، منها متعلق بعناصر داخلية ضمن الاتحاد الأوروبي، وأخرى خارجية زادت الوضع الداخلي تعقيدًا.
باتت بنية الاتحاد الأوروبي أحد الأسباب التي تدفع واحدًا من أصل أربعة أوروبيين إلى التصويت لأحزابٍ يمينية، وخصوصًا التوسع الذي حصل في العام ٢٠٠٤، عندما انضمت دول أوروبا الشرقية الناشئة عن تفكك الاتحاد السوفياتي إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي. فظهر التفاوت الكبير بين "أوروبا القديمة" و"أوروبا الجديدة"، حيث لا تزال دول أوروبا الشرقية تعاني من مشاكل اقتصادية ومالية، تجلت على سبيل المثال، في الفارق بين الحد الأدنى للأجور الذي يبلغ حوالى ٣٠٠ يورو في أوروبا الشرقية و٢٠٠٠ يورو في أوروبا الغربية.
إضافة إلى ذلك، الانضمام إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي يعني أيضًا الانتساب إلى السوق الموحدة. فاستفادت دول أوروبا الشرقية من السوق الموحدة، حيث قامت الشركات الكبرى بنقل معاملها من الدول الأوروبية الغربية إليها، للاستفادة من الأجور المنخفضة ولزيادة الأرباح، ما أدى إلى فقدان الكثير من العمال لوظائفهم. ومع سهولة تنقّل المواطنين داخل حدود الاتحاد، شهدت القارة هجرة كبيرة من الشرق إلى الغرب، فاستفاد الكثير من أرباب العمل في أوروبا الغربية من عمالة أقل كلفة من تلك الوطنية لتقليص نفقاتهم، ما أدى إلى ما يعرف بالإغراق الاجتماعي.
بات الأوروبيون يشعرون بالإحباط جراء كل هذه العوامل الاقتصادية والمالية والاجتماعية. وجاءت أزمة الهجرة في العام ٢٠١٥ لتزيد الضغط على الاتحاد الأوروبي، والإحباط عند الأوروبيين، وتساعدهم على نمو الشعور القومي الذي بنت عليه الأحزاب اليمينية سياساتها وخطاباتها الشعبوية، التي تناهض في سياساتها كيان الاتحاد الأوروبي.
بالتالي، على الاتحاد الأوروبي إعادة النظر في الوضع القائم في داخله وخارجه، للحفاظ على أسسه وعلى جاذبيته، كيانًا متماسكًا جامعًا ومستقرًا.